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Article

Fiduciary-Based Standards for Bailout
Contractors: What the Treasury Got Right
and Wrong in TARP
Kathleen Clark†
INTRODUCTION
In 2008 the United States faced a financial crisis of epic
proportions.1 The federal government responded by bailing out
many of the largest financial services companies.2 The bailouts
began in the spring of 2008 and expanded later that year with
the passage of legislation authorizing the Troubled Asset Relief
† Professor of Law and Israel Treiman Faculty Fellow, Washington
University in St. Louis, kathleen@wustl.edu. Some of the research for this Article was supported by a contract from the Administrative Conference of the
United States (Contract No. AC10101, FY 2010). The ideas expressed are my
own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Administrative Conference. I am grateful to Scott Amey, Cheryl Block, Daniel Keating, and Bruce
Shirk for commenting on earlier versions of this Article. Copyright © 2011 by
Kathleen Clark.
1. See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO
STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 250–62 (2010) (giving
a personal account of some important events in the financial crisis).
2. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 508–25 (2009)
(providing an overview of the financial crisis and the government’s sprawling
series of bailouts).
[T]he government forced the sales of one of the five largest investment banks, the largest thrift in the country, and a number of consumer banks. . . . [It] took over the country’s largest insurer and nationalized the two government-sponsored enterprises that mortally
suffered from the popping of the housing bubble. . . . [It] forc[ed] the
nation’s nine largest remaining financial institutions to accept $125
billion of government equity . . . . It flooded the global markets with
liquidity and entered the commercial paper market on a massive
scale. . . .[a]nd . . . rescue[d] . . . Citigroup and Bank of America, two
of the nation’s largest financial institutions.
Id. at 465; see also Karen Weise & Dan Nguyen, Interactive: Which Banks Got
Emergency Loans from the Fed During the Financial Meltdown?, PROPUBLICA
(Dec. 1, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://projects.propublica.org/tables/treasury-facilities
-loans.
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Program (TARP).3 Rather than examining whether the government should have bailed out these companies, this Article
examines one aspect of how the government bailed them out:
its reliance on outsiders—instead of government employees—to
implement the bailout program.4 In particular, this Article focuses on the imposition of fiduciary standards on the outsiders
who implemented the bailout.
Part I of this Article shows that the Treasury Department
(Treasury) delegated primary responsibility for implementing
the bailout to outsiders, and explains that this kind of outsourcing is common in the federal government. Part II describes how
Treasury imposed fiduciary-based ethics standards on these
outsiders, and identifies both restrictions that are worth emulating and those that are troubling. Part III puts Treasury’s actions into a broader context, showing that while the government imposes fiduciary-based ethics standards on its own
employees, it generally does not impose them on its service contractor personnel. Finally, this Article argues that the Treasury’s actual experience with bailout contractors should be studied more closely to assess the costs and benefits of imposing
ethics standards on outsiders who do the government’s work.
I. OUTSIDERS’ RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE BAILOUT
The TARP legislation recognized that Treasury would need
not only financial resources for bailout recipients but also additional personnel so Treasury could administer the bailout program.5 It therefore authorized Treasury to hire additional employees.6 In light of the need to act quickly during the financial
3. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3767.
4. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 2, at 469 n.10 (“The government
. . . hire[d] a team of sophisticated investment bankers, lawyers, and asset
managers to assist it in implementing the [bailout]. [I]t also contributed to the
privatization of government functions . . . .”). As of September 30, 2010, the
Treasury had spent $436.7 million on fifteen financial agency agreements and
eighty-one contracts. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT:
EXAMINING TREASURY’S USE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTRACTING AUTHORITY 5
(2010) [hereinafter CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT]; see also
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF
THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 130 (2011) [hereinafter CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH REPORT].
5. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 101(a)(1).
6. Id. (“The Secretary shall have direct hiring authority with respect to
the appointment of employees to administer this Act.”).
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crisis and the long delays often involved in hiring new federal
employees, Congress authorized Treasury to hire outsiders to
administer the bailout programs.7 The TARP legislation specified two different types of outsiders: contractors and financial
agents.8
Much scholarly and other attention has been paid to government contractors (particularly in the wake of privatization
efforts during the 1990s and the extensive use of contractors in
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).9 Government contractors
are private sector entities from whom the government purchases products or services.10 Less attention has been paid to the
government’s financial agents.11 Financial agents are privatesector entities to whom the government delegates particular
tasks, giving them governmental power or access to a government asset so that they can perform those tasks.12 The Treasury’s use of financial agency agreements dates back to the National Bank Act of 1864, which granted Treasury the authority
to appoint banks as financial agents of the government.13
Several features of financial agents made them key to the
Treasury’s ability to outsource the TARP program. First, financial agents can act on behalf of the sovereign and have deci7. Id.
8. The legislation authorized the Treasury to “[d]esignat[e] financial institutions as financial agents” and “enter[ ] into contracts,” including contracts
for the temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants under 5
U.S.C. § 3109. See id. § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii).
9. See, e.g., PRATAP CHATTERJEE, HALLIBURTON’S ARMY: HOW A WELLCONNECTED TEXAS OIL COMPANY REVOLUTIONIZED THE WAY AMERICA MAKES
WAR, at xv–xvi (2009); ALLISON STANGER, ONE NATION UNDER CONTRACT:
THE OUTSOURCING OF AMERICAN POWER AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN POLICY
2–7 (2009); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY
PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 147–50 (2007).
10. See 4 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1) (2006).
11. The focus of much of the available literature is on traditional contractors. See generally CHATTERJEE, supra note 9; STANGER, supra note 9;
VERKUIL; supra note 9.
12. 12 U.S.C. § 90 (2006) (authorizing government to employ national
banking associations as financial agents); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l
Bank, 889 F.2d 1067, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he government as principal
and in its sovereign capacity delegates to its financial agents some of the sovereign functions that the government itself would otherwise perform.”); 31
C.F.R. §§ 202.1–.7 (2010); Bruce Shirk, The Financial Crisis: Addressing
Troubled Assets, Teapot Dome, Tainted Contracts and False Claims 1 (Oct. 9,
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“The legislation provides
for award of contracts to financial institutions to acquire, manage, and dispose
of assets . . . .”).
13. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 889 F.2d at 1069.
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sionmaking authority that, at least in theory, cannot be outsourced to ordinary government contractors.14
Second, the government’s agreements with financial agents
are different from regular government contracts in that agreements with financial agents are not subject to the extensive set
of statutes and regulations limiting the government’s discretion
in awarding and administering contracts.15 The process of
choosing financial agents is more streamlined than that of
choosing government contractors, enabling Treasury to avoid
lengthy delays.16
Finally—and most important for the purposes of this Article—financial agents are agents in the eyes of the law.17 They
stand in a principal-agent relationship with the government.
By reason of their status as agents, they owe fiduciary duties to
the government.18
Treasury embraced the statutory authority to use outsiders. It entered into agreements with fifteen financial agents
and fifty-three contractors.19 Financial agents manage TARP
investments.20 Contractors perform others services, including
auditing and legal services.21 Treasury has paid these contractors and financial agents more than $400 million to administer
TARP.22

14. Id. at 1069–70; Policy Letter on Inherently Governmental Functions,
57 Fed. Reg. 45,096 (Sept. 30, 1992), available at http://www.census.gov/procur/
www/fssp/att10a.html.
15. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 889 F.2d at 1069 (holding that financial
agency agreements are not subject to the federal procurement law which governs ordinary contracts).
16. See Treasury’s Use of Emergency Contracting Authority: Hearing Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111 Cong. 17 (2010) (testimony of Gary Grippo,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fiscal Operations and Policy, United States
Department of the Treasury), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG
-111shrg65080/html/CHRG-111shrg65080.htm (describing the differences between the process of selecting contractors and the process of selecting agents).
17. See id. at 2.
18. See Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 889 F.2d at 1069; cf. Transactive Corp.
v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 239–41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that financial
institutions that administer an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) system are
not financial agents of the government).
19. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 5; see
also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at 130.
20. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
21. Id. at 2 (“The largest TARP contracts have gone to law firms, investment management firms, and audit firms.”).
22. Id. at 5.

1618

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1614

These outsiders performed “many of the TARP’s most critical functions.”23 Most of the individuals who administer TARP
are not government employees, but instead are employed by
these outside organizations.24 According to the Congressional
Oversight Panel, Treasury engaged in “the wholesale delegation of the administration of [these] multi-billion dollar programs to outside entities.”25
This “wholesale delegation” of the government’s work put
the government at risk for abuse by those outsiders. As the
next section explains, Congress and Treasury recognized that
risk and put in place fiduciary-based ethics standards for those
outsiders to prevent or deter such abuse.
II. IMPOSITION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES ON OUTSIDERS
ADMINISTERING THE BAILOUT
The TARP legislation itself, the regulations implementing
that legislation, and the specific contracts between Treasury
and outsiders all reflect the fiduciary nature of the relationship
between the government and the outsiders administering the
TARP program.26 This Part describes the law of fiduciary relationships and shows how the TARP program explicitly and implicitly adopts fiduciary standards for the outsiders administering the bailout.
A. THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
In most relationships between two parties, the law presumes that each party is equal to the other.27 The parties
themselves can define the contours of their relationship
23. Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-16,
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: ONE YEAR LATER, ACTIONS ARE NEEDED
TO ADDRESS REMAINING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES
28 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1016.pdf (noting that
the Treasury had fifty-two contractors and financial agents supporting TARP
administration and operations).
24. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 3
(“Treasury has only 220 staffers working on the TARP [while Fannie Mae] has
600 employees working to fulfill its TARP commitments.”).
25. Id. at 5.
26. See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text. The government uses
the term “contract” to refer to an arrangement with a contractor, the term
“agreement” to refer to an arrangement with a financial agent, and the term
“arrangement” to refer to both contracts and agreements. See CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 5–6. This Article refers
to all of these arrangements as contracts.
27. See Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 285, 287 n.20 (1989) (explaining the principal/principal relationship).
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through contractual agreement.28 Any agreement between
them is presumed to reflect their intentions, and courts will enforce that agreement.29
But the law treats differently certain types of relationships: those in which one party stands in a position of trust relative to the other.30 In a relationship of trust, the trusted party
is expected to act for the benefit of the other, and the law imposes a fiduciary obligation on the trusted party to ensure that
she acts solely in the interest of the trusting party.31 These are
called fiduciary relationships, and the trusted party is called a
fiduciary.32 These relationships are governed not just by the
explicit terms of any agreement between the parties, but by ad-

28. Robert Flannigan characterizes this as a “principal/principal relationship” and states that in such relationships “[n]o fiduciary obligation is presumed to exist.” Id. at 287. Flannigan asserts that “[a] principal/principal relationship exists, for example, between arm’s length buyers and sellers.” Id. at
287 n.20. This assertion is certainly accurate with regard to “buyers and sellers” of goods. Whether it is also true for “buyers and sellers” of services would
depend on the nature of the services at issue. If the service involves one party
giving advice to the other or one party gaining access to the other’s assets,
then it would be a fiduciary relationship even if entered into through arm’slength bargaining. For an example of this concept, see United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 889 F.2d 1067, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that
certain banks which placed bids in order to administer a reporting system entered an agency relationship).
29. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887 (“[T]hese creatures of contract law are
controlled by the parties’ manifest intention . . . .”). But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (discussing when a contract is unenforceable because it is unconscionable).
30. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?
An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 69; Flannigan, supra note 27, at 285; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795,
800 (1983); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539,
540 (1949); J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51, 75 (1981).
31. Flannigan, supra note 27, at 306 (“The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or
in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion
which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical
sense.” (quoting Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984 ) 156 CLR 41,
96–97 (Austl.))); see also id. at 307 (“[W]here by statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one party has an obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation carries with it a discretionary power, the
party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary.” (quoting Guerin v. The Queen,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 384 (Can.))).
32. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009) (“[A fiduciary is a]
person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters
within the scope of their [fiduciary] relationship.”).
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ditional terms imposed by the common law.33 The law sees
these relationships as valuable and will prevent fiduciaries
from abusing their position of trust.34
Fiduciary relationships arise in two distinct factual settings.35 In the first, an influence-based trust relationship, a
person trusts a fiduciary to influence her decision or action.36 In
the second, an access-based trust relationship, a person entrusts a fiduciary with access to an asset.37 The asset could be
tangible property, a financial instrument, or confidential information instead of an “influence” over the trusted party.38
But the mere existence of influence or access is not enough
to create a fiduciary relationship.39 The influence or access
must be coupled with an expectation (either subjectively intended or imposed by operation of law) that the party providing
the influence or being given access will act in the interest of the
trusting party.40 If one party gives another access to her assets
but there is no expectation that the other will use that access
33. See DeMott, supra note 29, at 887 (“[O]nce a court concludes that a
particular relationship has a fiduciary character, the parties’ manifest intention does not control their obligations to each other as dispositively as it does
under a contract analysis.”).
34. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for
Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 542 (2010) (discussing how courts have used fiduciary law to curb corporate abuse).
35. Flannigan, supra note 27, at 309 (“There are . . . two kinds of trusts
that will attract fiduciary status. They are, firstly, the trust which gives the
trusted party the ability to exercise ‘influence’ over the trusting party and, secondly, the trust which allows the trusted party to acquire ‘access’ to the employment of assets.”).
36. Flannigan refers to this type as a “deferential trust.” Id.
37. Flannigan refers to this as a “vigilant trust.” Id.
38. The fiduciary obligation deters the fiduciary from acting in a way that
would “have the effect of diverting or not maintaining the asset value.” Id. at
292. This is commonly referred to as “agency costs,” but Flannigan refers to
them as “intermediary costs.” Id. at 289. Flannigan further explains:
Both types of trust in fact result in the trusted party acquiring
“access” to the employment of assets. In the case of deferential trust,
however, the access is indirect because it occurs through “influence”
exerted by the trusted party. But in either case, and to the same extent, the “access” to assets may be turned to mischievous ends.
Id. at 309.
39. See Peterson v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1204, 1214
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that a client’s isolated transaction for basic tax preparation and advice was not enough to create a fiduciary relationship).
40. See, e.g., Pommier v. Peoples Bank Marycrest, 967 F.2d 1115, 1119
(7th Cir. 1992) (“The fact that one party trusts the other is insufficient. We
trust most people with whom we choose to do business. The dominant party
must accept the responsibility, accept the trust of the other party before a
court can find a fiduciary relationship.” (citations omitted)).
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for her benefit, then she has merely given the other a gift and
no fiduciary obligation arises.41 Similarly, if someone is in a position to influence the actions of another, but there is no expectation that she should act on the other’s behalf, then no fiduciary duty arises.42
Courts have recognized the fiduciary nature of many different types of relationships, including those between trustees
and beneficiaries, agents and principals, lawyers and clients,
and employees and employers.43 The precise contours of a fiduciary’s obligation vary depending on the kinds of tasks the fiduciary is asked to perform.44 Robert Flannigan has explained
that the fiduciary obligation has four components: conflict, influence, partiality, and avoidance.45 The conflict component of
fiduciary obligation prohibits a fiduciary from putting herself in
a position where her own interest conflicts with her duty toward the beneficiary.46 More concretely, it prohibits a fiduciary
from making a recommendation or using government property
(including information) in a way that provides a benefit to herself or to others close to her rather than to the beneficiary.47
The influence component subjects transactions between certain
fiduciaries and their beneficiaries to heightened scrutiny to ensure that the fiduciary has not unduly influenced the beneficiary’s decision to enter the transaction.48 The partiality component requires fiduciaries given responsibility for allocating
benefits among beneficiaries to treat beneficiaries of the same
class equally and beneficiaries of different classes fairly.49 The
avoidance component prohibits certain fiduciaries from delegat41. Flannigan, supra note 27, at 308 (“Not every kind of access will be of a
fiduciary character. A person may acquire access as a gift.”).
42. See, e.g., KATHLEEN CLARK, ETHICS FOR AN OUTSOURCED
GOVERNMENT: REVISED DRAFT 10 n.83 (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/
wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/03/Clark-Report-v.2.pdf (noting that the
fiduciary norm against conflicts of interest does not apply to “representative”
members of federal advisory committees because they “represent particular
industries or interest groups”).
43. Clark, supra note 30. The common law has recognized that government employees owe the government fiduciary duties, and the extensive set of
government ethics statutes and regulations largely reflect fiduciary obligations of government employees. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 18–19.
44. Clark, supra note 30, at 70 (discussing the task of defining the content
of a fiduciary obligation by its component parts).
45. Flannigan, supra note 27, at 311–12.
46. See id. at 311.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 312.
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ing their duties to others or putting themselves in a position
where, because of conflict or other concerns, they could not act
on behalf of the beneficiary.50
As the following discussion demonstrates, the TARP legislation, regulations, and contracts all express the conflict component of the fiduciary duty owed by the outsiders who administer the TARP program. To a lesser degree, they also reflect
the avoidance component of fiduciary duty obligations.
B. EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT RECOGNITION THAT OUTSIDERS
ADMINISTERING THE BAILOUT OWE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
This section discusses how the TARP legislation, its implementing regulations, and the TARP contracts themselves
recognize the fiduciary position of the outsiders implementing
the bailout program.
The TARP legislation implicitly recognized that outsiders
implementing the TARP program would stand in a fiduciary
position.51 This recognition appears in two different ways in the
statute. First, the statute classified some of the outsiders who
would implement the program as “agents,” a technical legal
term that carries with it the fiduciary responsibilities of agency
law.52 The statute authorized Treasury to “[d]esignate financial
institutions as financial agents of the Federal Government.”53
Financial agents owe the government fiduciary duties.54
50. See id.
51. In addition to this implicit recognition of the fiduciary status of outsiders implementing the TARP, the statute explicitly imposed fiduciary duties
on managers of any public-private investment funds by requiring that they
acknowledge in writing their fiduciary duty to public investors. Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 125, 122 Stat. 3765,
3791. The statute also invokes another term, “unjust enrichment,” that is
sometimes associated with the fiduciary duty. Id. § 101(e). It requires the
Treasury to “prevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions participating
in [the] program . . . including by preventing the sale of a troubled asset to the
Secretary at a higher price than what the seller paid to purchase the asset.”
Id. But this provision addresses the financial institutions that would be recipients of TARP aid, not the outsiders (financial agents and contractors) that
would implement the TARP program. See id. § 101(a). Here, the term “unjust
enrichment” does not imply that these recipient financial institutions owe the
government a fiduciary duty, but merely that they should not benefit unduly
from government largesse by selling a “troubled asset” at a higher price than
they paid for it. See id. § 101(e).
52. See id. § 101(c)(3).
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PROCESS FOR SELECTING
ASSET MANAGERS PURSUANT TO THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
ACT OF 2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
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The second way that the TARP legislation implicitly recognized the fiduciary position of those outsiders was its requirement that Treasury “address and manage [and] prohibit conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with . . . the
selection or hiring of contractors or advisors, including asset
managers,” the purchase and management of troubled assets,
and “any other potential conflict of interest, as the Secretary
deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest.”55 This
statutory attention to outsiders’ conflicts of interest is implicit
recognition that those outsiders owe fiduciary duties. As discussed above, in most relationships, each party is considered to
be equal and is not required to have any particular regard for
the interests of the other party.56 The very premise of contract
law is that both parties will have conflicting interests and will
protect those interests in negotiating an agreement between
them.57 It is only where one party is supposed to act to benefit
the other that conflicts of interest are at issue.58 One of the
components of the fiduciary duty is that the trusted party must
not put herself in a position where her interests conflict with
her duty to the beneficiary.59
Congress mandated that Treasury issue conflict-of-interest
“[r]egulations or guidelines . . . as soon as practicable after the
date of enactment.”60 Treasury did so by issuing Interim Guidelines for Conflicts of Interest just three days after passage of
TARP in October 200861 and issuing regulations three months
later.62 Treasury’s regulations are a thorough expression of the
conflict component of the fiduciary duty—the prohibition on
making decisions or giving advice where the decision or advice
could advance the fiduciary’s interest rather than (or in addi-

press-releases/Documents/assetmanagers.pdf (“As financial agents, asset managers will have a fiduciary agent-principal relationship with the Treasury with
a responsibility for protecting the interests of the United States.”).
55. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 108(a).
56. See Flannigan, supra note 27, at 287 n.20.
57. See DeMott, supra note 29, at 887 (“[T]hese creatures of common law
are controlled by the parties manifest intention . . . .”).
58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1977) (stating
that a fiduciary duty arises when one party must act for the benefit of another).
59. See Flannigan, supra note 27, at 311.
60. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 108(b).
61. Interim Guidelines for Conflicts of Interest, U.S. DEPARTMENT
TREASURY (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/hp1180.aspx; see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 8 (“Interim Final Rule [issued] on January 21, 2009.”).
62. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 31.200–.218 (2010).
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tion to) that of the beneficiary.63 The regulations impose comprehensive ethics standards on the contractors who perform
services to implement TARP.64 They address both the organizational conflicts of interest of the bailout contracting firms65 and
the personal conflicts of interest of those firms’ employees.66
They regulate the financial interests of contractor personnel,67
their receipt of gifts,68 outside employment,69 and use of government resources.70
The conflict component is implicated whenever a fiduciary
has the responsibility to make or influence a decision that could
affect her own interests as well as that of the beneficiary. The
standard course is to prohibit a fiduciary from putting herself
in a position where her decisions or advice could affect her own
interests (or those of someone close to her).71 Alternatively, a
fiduciary can disclose the conflict and give the beneficiary the
opportunity to waive it.72
The TARP regulations include both a narrow and a broad
expression of the conflict component. The narrow provision
prohibits contractor personnel who are responsible for giving
advice about the purchase of troubled assets from selling such
assets,73 and it prohibits those who are responsible for valuing,
managing, or disposing of troubled assets from purchasing
them.74 The broad provision prohibits certain contractor personnel from having “a personal, business, or financial interest
. . . that could adversely affect [her] ability to perform[,] . . . her
objectivity or judgment in such performance, or . . . her ability
63. See generally Flannigan, supra note 27, at 311 (discussing the “conflict” component of the fiduciary obligation).
64. See 31 C.F.R. § 31.200 (“This regulation addresses actual and potential conflicts of interest that may arise from contracts and financial agency
agreements between private sector entities and the Treasury for services under TARP . . . .”).
65. Id. § 31.211.
66. Id. § 31.212; see also CLARK, supra note 42, at 23–24 (distinguishing
between personal and organizational conflicts).
67. Id. § 31.201. The TARP regulation does not impose restrictions directly on contractor personnel. Instead, it mandates that contractors ensure that
their employees “have no personal conflicts of interest.” Id. § 31.212(a).
68. Id. § 31.213(a)(1).
69. Id. § 31.214.
70. Id. § 31.213(a)(2) (“Treasury property”); id. § 31.217 (“nonpublic information”).
71. Clark, supra note 30, at 85.
72. An additional option is for the fiduciary to find ways to mitigate the
conflict of interest. 48 C.F.R. § 9.506(b)(1) (2010).
73. 31 C.F.R. § 31.214(b).
74. Id. § 31.214(a).
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to represent the interest of the Treasury.”75 This restriction
reaches not just the interests of the individuals performing
TARP work, but also the interests of their family members.76
This regulatory language is so broad that it is difficult to discern its dimensions. Thus, Treasury requires that these contractor personnel disclose any such interests to the TARP contractor.77 After this disclosure, the TARP contractor has three
options: (1) certify that the relevant personnel have no conflicts, (2) create a plan to mitigate those conflicts and seek
Treasury’s approval of that plan, or (3) seek Treasury’s waiver
of the conflicts.78
The conflict component is also implicated when a fiduciary
accepts a gift from someone who has an interest in the decisions the fiduciary makes or the advice that she gives.79 The issue is whether the fiduciary may be influenced in her decisionmaking or advice giving by such a gift. Since it can be
difficult or impossible to detect whether a fiduciary is actually
influenced in this way, the standard course is to prohibit a fiduciary from accepting such gifts or permit them to accept only
gifts of minimal value.80 The Treasury regulations take the first
approach, prohibiting TARP contractor personnel from accepting and soliciting gifts from anyone whose interests could be
substantially affected by the contract.81
Another aspect of the fiduciary duty reflected in TARP is
the prohibition on using for one’s own benefit property that belongs to a beneficiary.82 The property may be tangible, or it may
be information. The fiduciary duty protects both, as do Treas75. Id. § 31.201(5). The TARP regulation does not impose restrictions directly on contractor personnel. Instead, it mandates that contractors ensure
that their employees “have no personal conflicts of interest.” Id. § 31.212(a).
76. Id. § 31.212(b) (“[A personal conflict of interest includes an individual’s] personal, business, and financial relationships, as well as those of their
spouses, minor children, and other family members with whom the individuals
have a close personal relationship that would cause a reasonable person with
knowledge of the relevant facts to question the individual’s ability to perform,
his or her objectivity or judgment in such performance, or his or her ability to
represent the interests of the Treasury.” (emphasis added)).
77. Id. The regulation specifies that this disclosure must be at least as detailed as that required of high-level executive branch officials. Id.
§ 31.217(c)(5).
78. Id. § 31.212(d).
79. Clark, supra note 30, at 79.
80. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.302 (2010) (gift restrictions on government
employees).
81. 31 C.F.R. § 31.213(a)(1).
82. Id. § 31.213(a)(2).
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ury’s regulations. TARP contractor personnel are prohibited
from “improper use of Treasury property,”83 and are prohibited
from both disclosing and using “nonpublic information.”84 The
TARP regulations also require contractors to train any personnel who receive nonpublic information on their duty of confidentiality.85
Treasury’s approach is not just comprehensive but also
flexible. While all bailout services are presumptively covered by
the restrictions, Treasury allows the TARP Chief Compliance
Officer to exempt contracts for “administrative services” that do
not implicate fiduciary concerns.86
Fiduciary principles are found not just in the TARP legislation and Treasury’s regulations, but also in Treasury’s specific
contractual agreements with outsiders. In its agreements with
financial agents, the financial agents must acknowledge that
they “owe[] a fiduciary duty of loyalty and fair dealing to the
United States” and “agree[] to act at all times in the best interests of the United States.”87 In addition to this explicit statement of their fiduciary duties, the agreements also implement
the conflict and avoidance components of the fiduciary duty, requiring the disclosure and mitigation of conflicts of interest88

83. Id.
84. Id. § 31.217(b)(1). The TARP regulation defines “nonpublic information” as “[a]ny information that Treasury provides to a [contractor] . . . or that
the [contractor] obtains or develops pursuant to the arrangement . . . until the
Treasury determines otherwise in writing, or the information becomes part of
the body of public information from a source other than the retained entity.”
Id. § 31.217(a).
85. Id. § 31.217(c)(3).
86. See id. § 31.200(b) (addressing contractual conflicts of interest between the private sector and the Treasury).
87. See, e.g., Financial Agency Agreement for Custodian, Accounting, Auction Management and Other Infrastructure Services for a Portfolio of Troubled
Mortgage-Related Assets, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, § 5 (Dec. 29, 2008),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about/procurement/faa/
Financial_Agency_Agreements/Bank%20of%20New%20York%20Mellon.pdf
[hereinafter Financial Agency Agreement]; see also id. § 18.C (“[A contractual
default occurs when] the Financial Agent breaches a fiduciary duty to the
United States with respect to its responsibilities under this FAA.”).
88. See, e.g., id. § 12.H (“The Financial Agent covenants to disclose all actual or potential organizational conflicts of interest, including conflicts with
the interests of any corporate parents, affiliates, and subsidiaries, and to
avoid, mitigate, or neutralize to the extent feasible and to the Treasury’s satisfaction any personal or organizational conflicts of interest that may be identified by the Treasury or the Financial Institution.”).
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and prohibiting agents from delegating to others the work to be
performed.89
These financial agency agreements (FAAs) also protect confidential information. They require financial agents “to use any
confidential information or assets of the United States received
or developed in connection with this FAA solely for the purposes of fulfilling its duties to Treasury and not for its own commercial purposes or for those of a third party.”90 They prohibit
financial agents from disclosing confidential information except
to Treasury employees and others “who have a legitimate need
to know the information to assist in the proper performance of
services required by” the agreement.91 These provisions express
a fiduciary’s obligation not to exploit a beneficiary’s asset: the
confidential information that belongs to the beneficiary.
Some aspects of these agreements go beyond legitimate
protection for a beneficiary’s confidential information. They
prohibit financial agents from “mak[ing] statements to the media or issu[ing] press releases regarding their services under
this FAA without the prior written consent of the Treasury.”92
They prohibit the agent from revealing the agreement to third
parties93 (although Treasury eventually posted redacted versions of all TARP FAAs and contracts on the web94). But what
is most striking is that the agreements implement the confidentiality obligation in a particularly strict way. They require
that “prior to any submission for publication, any book, article,
column or other written work for general publication that is
based upon any knowledge . . . obtain[ed] during the course of
. . . work in connection with the Treasury,” financial agent personnel must submit such manuscripts to the government for
89. See, e.g., id. § 13 (“The Financial Agent shall use only its own employees and employees of corporate affiliates to perform services under this
FAA, unless the Financial Agent obtains the prior written consent of the Treasury to use contractors to perform such services.”).
90. Id. § 5.
91. Id. § 6.D.
92. Id. § 25.B.
93. Id. § 25.C.
94. See About Financial Stability, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about/procurement/faa/pages/faa
.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (listing the financial agency agreements); see
also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM [SIGTARP], INITIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 22 (Feb. 6,
2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/SIGTARP_
Initial_Report_to_ the_Congress.pdf (noting that on December 2008 SIGTARP
asked that all TARP agreements be posted on the web, and that on January
28, 2009, the Treasury announced that it would do so).
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review.95 The personnel also “assign to the Federal Government
all rights, royalties, remunerations and emoluments that have
resulted or will result or may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation of confidential information not consistent
with the terms of this Agreement.”96 These prepublication review requirements apply not just to TARP financial agents, but
also to TARP contractors.97 They exceed a mere prohibition on
the disclosure of confidential information, imposing a prior restraint. They also require outsider personnel to check with
Treasury before publishing anything related to the TARP work.
While the government can and should protect the confidentiality of some TARP-related information, not every aspect of TARP
work is confidential. Treasury’s TARP regulations do not mention prepublication review, and its decision to include this provision in its contracts has escaped the scrutiny of the TARP
oversight bodies and the press.
Prepublication review agreements are not entirely unprecedented. The government has imposed them in at least one
other context: intelligence. While most government employees
and contractor personnel who are given access to classified information are subject to confidentiality agreements, intelligence personnel also sign prepublication review agreements.98
When a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee
published a book without going through prepublication review,
the government sought a constructive trust on his earnings
from the book.99 The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of his prepublication review agreement, recognizing the
acute sensitivity of the information entrusted to CIA personnel.100 It imposed a constructive trust on this former employee’s
royalties, noting his fiduciary status.101 But it is by no means
clear that the information entrusted to TARP contractors is of
similar sensitivity to that entrusted to intelligence personnel or
that it justifies the extreme measure of a prior restraint.
95. Financial Agency Agreement, supra note 87, exhibit D, ¶ 7.
96. Id.
97. E.g., Contract No. TOFS-09-0009 with Simpson Thacher & Bartlett for
legal services, Attachment J-1 Non-Disclosure Agreement, ¶ 7 (“I will submit
to the Treasury for security review, prior to any submission for publication,
any book, article, column or other written work for general publication that is
based upon any knowledge I obtain during the course of my work in connection with the Treasury.”).
98. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507–08 (1980).
99. Id. at 508.
100. Id. at 515–16.
101. Id.
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III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES: ATYPICAL FOR CONTRACTORS,
BUT TYPICAL FOR EMPLOYEES
While government bailouts may be exceptional events,102
the government’s decision to rely on contractors to implement
the bailout was far from exceptional. The government routinely
relies on contractors to perform nearly all of its functions.103 If
you pick almost any government task and examine who is actually performing it, you are likely to find that contractor employees—rather than or in addition to government employees—
are performing that task.104
This reliance on contractors is true throughout the federal
government, but some agencies rely more heavily on contractors than others.105 In some agencies, more than half of the
102. See Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 152 (2010) (“[T]he extent and variety of recent government bailouts have been extraordinary . . . .”).
103. See PHILLIP J. COOPER, GOVERNING BY CONTRACT: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS 11 (2003) (“[A]gencies do not have the
capacity to deliver directly the services and perform the tasks with which they
are charged by law . . . [and] are forced to depend on contractors.”); Donald F.
Kettl, After the Reforms, GOV’T. EXECUTIVE, Apr. 1988, at 38 (“The federal
government . . . does relatively little itself. [I]t does most of its work through
contracts with the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, grants to state and local
governments, special provisions in the tax code, and regulations on corporate
and individual behavior.”).
104. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 197–98 (1999)
(demonstrating the general decrease in civil service jobs and increase in contract jobs across a variety of government agencies); Dan Guttman, Governance
By Contract: Constitutional Visions, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 322–23 (2004)
(“In the global transformation from Government to governance . . . the United
States pioneered in the renewed deployment of private contractors to perform
the basic work of Government.”). See generally VERKUIL, supra note 9, at 2–3,
31–33, 47, (describing how federal contracting spans military, environmental,
natural disaster relief, homeland security, and transportation concerns).
105. The Department of Energy relies heavily on their contractors, prompting one analyst to say that the “Energy Department is little more than a hollow shell over a vast network of contractors.” Kettl, supra note 103, at 38. Similarly, much of NASA’s work is done by contractors. Lodge 1858, Am. Fed’n of
Gov’t Emps. v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[C]ongress directed
reductions in NASA’s civil service work force at the same time that it continued to approve its budget requests for funds to meet its obligations under its
support service contracts . . . .”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-119,
HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT (2003) (“Much of NASA’s success
depends on the work of its contractors . . . .”); Guttman, supra note 104, at 333
(“NASA . . . was created with a fundamental dependence on contractors.”);
Ariana Eunjung Cha, At NASA, Concerns on Contractors, WASH. POST, Feb.
17, 2003, at A1, available at 2003 WLNR 18648342 (indicating that contractors train crew, draw up flight plans, “dominate mission control,” and perform
shuttle maintenance and upgrades all with little or no oversight).
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“workforce” consists of individuals who are actually employed
by contractors.106 The tasks that contractor personnel perform
are sometimes mundane, such as mowing lawns. But in other
cases, the tasks are more sensitive or sophisticated, such as
giving advice about how to structure or implement particular
programs.107
An extensive array of ethics statutes and rules regulate the
ethics of government employees,108 and these restrictions largely reflect employees’ fiduciary duties.109 They restrict employees’ financial interests, acceptance of gifts, outside activities, use of government resources (including information), and
the kinds of work permissible after leaving the government.110
These restrictions generally help to ensure that employees
make decisions in the interest of the government rather than a
private interest.111
On the other hand, the government generally does not impose ethics restrictions on the personnel of government contractors.112 It does not even have any systematic way of monitoring
whether contractor personnel have conflicts of interest. The
government has imposed restrictions based on the financial interests of the companies that have government contracts, but
106. See Press Release, Senate Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs Comm., Lieberman, Collins Astounded DHS Contract Workers Exceed Number of Civilian
Employees (Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index
.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecord_id=01a96af1-5056-8059
-7687-4190c852b289 (presenting a letter sent by senators to Secretary Janet
Napolitano expressing surprise that the DHS has more contractor personnel
than civilian employees). Similarly, “the vast majority of people working on
the TARP today receive their paychecks from private companies, not the federal government.” CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4,
at 3. The number of Treasury Department employees working on all TARP
programs totals only 220, while a single TARP contractor has over 600 employees working on TARP. Id.
107. See Kathleen Clark, Financial Conflicts of Interest in and out of Government, 62 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785520 (describing the
work of Treasury contractor Dan Jester in connection with the bailout of AIG).
108. See Clark, supra note 30, at 58, 63–67 (describing the expansion of
ethics regulation).
109. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 13 (“Congress and the executive branch
have also recognized the fiduciary nature of government power by enacting
statutes and regulations that reflect employee’s fiduciary duties.”); Clark, supra note 30, at 73–77 (explaining why the fiduciary obligation is an appropriate foundation for government ethics regulation).
110. CLARK, supra note 42, at 5–7.
111. Id. at 12–14.
112. Id. at 23 (“Most of the government ethics statutes and regulations described [in the report] do not apply to government contractor personnel . . . .”).
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they generally do not reach the interests of individual employees of those contractors.113 With these TARP regulations,
Treasury became only the seventh federal agency to adopt ethics regulations for contractor personnel.114
CONCLUSION
Some commentators criticize the government’s extensive
reliance on contractors.115 But the government has legitimate
reasons for outsourcing some services to contractors rather
than having its own employees perform these tasks. First, outsourcing enables the government to obtain expertise and skills
not found among government employees.116 Second, it enables
the government to respond quickly and flexibly to a sudden crisis, giving it a surge capacity to temporarily increase its workforce for tasks lasting months or a few years rather than decades.117
113. Some have argued that these organizational conflicts of interest are
actually aimed at protecting the interests of other government contractors
more than the interests of the government itself. See, e.g., Daniel Guttman,
Organizational Conflicts of Interest and the Growth of Big Government, 15
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 312–13, 316–17 (1978).
114. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 28 (indicating the Treasury as one of
seven agencies with regulations).
115. See, e.g., Dan Guttman, The United States Enrichment Corporation: A
Failing Privatisation, 23 ASIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 247, 265–67 (2001) (concluding
that the U. S. Enrichment Corporation failed and proposing reasons for its
failure).
116. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., CONFLICT OF INTEREST
AND FEDERAL SERVICE 148–49 (1960) (indicating the government can get expertise from individuals they could not otherwise employ); BAYLESS MANNING,
FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 31 (1964) (“[Contracting has] made it
possible to turn to government use and public advantage the talents of many
. . . who would not have been willing to become regular government employees.”).
117. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
HURRICANE KATRINA TEMPORARY HOUSING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
CONTRACTS 2 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/
OIG_08-88_Aug08.pdf (“FEMA human capital resources were not sufficient to
coordinate the massive and urgent logistical response effort without substantial assistance. FEMA awarded contracts to four contractors . . . .”). Ironically,
the Inspector General investigation previously cited was itself outsourced to
an accounting firm, and the Inspector General’s office merely added a threeparagraph preface and a coversheet. See Letter from Jocelyn Hill, Partner,
Williams, Adley & Company, LLP, to Mathew Jadacki, Deputy Inspector Gen.,
Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 20, 2008), in
HURRICANE KATRINA TEMPORARY HOUSING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
CONTRACTS, supra (available prior to the table of contents of the Inspector
General investigation). Some argue that outsourcing saves the government
money, see Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing
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Both of these factors played a role in the government’s decision to rely on contractors in connection with its bailout of financial institutions. The government enlisted contractors to
perform a wide range of services: legal services, the valuation of
assets to be sold, the management of assets whose ownership
would be maintained, and auditing.118
When the government decides to rely on outsiders rather
than its own employees to perform a task, it needs to determine
whether those outsiders should be subject to fiduciary-based
standards. Not all contractors should be. But contractors who
can influence government decisions or have access to government resources (including confidential information) should be
subjected to fiduciary-based ethics standards.
Congress and Treasury have imposed a comprehensive set
of ethics restrictions on the outsiders implementing the TARP
program. These restrictions reflect the fiduciary nature of the
outsiders’ role: the government has entrusted them with access
to government assets, and is trusting them to influence government action. Several aspects of the ethics standards for
TARP contractors are relatively unusual, including: reaching
not just the individual interests of contractor personnel, but also the interests of their family members; requiring contractor
personnel to disclose their financial interests; and providing the
flexibility to exempt “administrative services” from enhanced
ethics standards. Another unusual feature of Treasury’s contracts with outsiders was its imposition of prepublication review agreements—something that appears to be unprecedented
outside the intelligence field.
Treasury’s decision to rely on outsiders was not unusual,
but its decision to impose fiduciary-based ethics restrictions on
the outsiders implementing TARP was. Its actual experience in
imposing these standards should be studied more closely to asPublic Law Concerns: A Contracting Management Perspective, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 153,
180 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (suggesting government jobs
do not pay enough to keep some of the talent in the private sector). But there
is no consensus on this issue. Compare Chris Edwards, Public Sector Unions
and the Rising Costs of Employee Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87, 90 tbl.1 (2010)
(indicating that compensation for state and local workers is higher than private sector employees), with Jeffrey Keefe, Debunking the Myth of the Overcompensated Public Employee: The Evidence (EPI Briefing, Paper No. 276,
2010), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/8808ae41b085032c0b_8um6bh5ty.pdf
(detailing the controversy surrounding public sector compensation).
118. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER REPORT, supra note 4, at 23
fig.3.
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sess the costs and benefits of imposing fiduciary-based ethics
standards on outsiders who do the government’s work. The
government is currently considering imposing some of these
features, including financial disclosure requirements, on a
broader set of contractor personnel: those who assist the government in contracting.119 The costs involved in implementing
this kind of financial disclosure regime and the First Amendment concerns raised by the imposition of prepublication review should be examined more closely before the government
expands these approaches to protecting the public trust.

119. Preventing Personal Conflicts of Interest for Contractor Employees
Performing Acquisition Functions, 74 Fed. Reg. 58,584 –89 (Nov. 13, 2009) (to
be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 3, 52).
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APPENDIX: ETHICS RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYEES OF
BAILOUT CONTRACTORS
ETHICS RESTRICTIONS ON BAILOUT CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
Issue

Contracts
Affected

financial
interests

all

gifts

all

conflicting
employment

government
information

government
property

Personnel
Affected

Prohibition

“a personal, business, or financial
interest of an individual, his or her
spouse, minor child, or other family
“key
member with whom the individual has
individuals”a &
a close personal relationship, that
“management
could adversely affect the individual’s
officials performability to perform under the arrangeing work under
ment, his or her objectivity or judgb
the” contract
ment in such performance, or his or
her ability to represent the interests of
the Treasury”c
accept / solicit favors / gifts / items of
monetary value from any individual or
entity whom the retained entity / officer / partner / employee knows is
officers,
seeking official action from Treasury
partners, &
in connection with the arrangement or
employees
has interests which may be substantially affected by the performance or
nonperformance of duties to Treasury
under the arrangementd

involving
acquisition /
valuation /
purchase / offer to purchase / assist
management /
management anyone in purchasing / offering to
disposition of
officials perform-purchase assetse
specific
ing work under
troubled
the arrangement
assets
& key
involving
individuals
sell / offer to sell / act on behalf of any
giving advice
re: purchase
with respect to sale of asset to Treasof troubled
uryf
assets
management
“Disclose nonpublic information to
officials performanyone”
ing work under
all
“Use or allow the use of any nonpublic
the arrangement
information to further any private
& key
interest”h
individualsg
“Improperly use or allow the improper
officers,
use of Treasury property for the perall
partners, &
sonal benefit of any individual or entiemployees
ty other than the Treasury”i
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IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
Contractor Must Obtain Disclosures / Certifications from Its
Personnel
Personnel
Affected

“key
individuals” &
“management
officials
performing
work under
the” contract

Required Disclosure / Certification
“information . . . in writing about their personal, business, and
financial relationships, as well as those of their spouses, minor
children, and other family members with whom the individuals
have a close personal relationship that would cause a reasonable
person with knowledge of the relevant facts to question the individual’s ability to perform, his or her objectivity or judgment in such
performance, or his or her ability to represent the interests of the
Treasury”j
certification that they will not disclose nonpublic information, or
use or allow the use of nonpublic information to further any private
interestk
the information described above at a level of detail at least as extensive as the public financial disclosures required of high-level
officials (Office of Government Ethics Form 278)l

Disclosure of Financial Interests / Certification of No
Conflicting Interests to Agency
Personnel
Required Disclosure / Certification
Affected
“key
individuals” &
“management
certify that these individuals have no personal conflicts of interest,
officials
or are subject to a mitigation plan or waiver approved by Treasurym
performing
work under
the” contract

Train Employees About Ethics Standards
Employees
Provision
Affected
all “persons
must provide “[p]eriodic training to ensure that [they] know their
receiving
obligation to maintain its confidentiality and to use it only for purnonpublic
poses contemplated by the arrangement”n
information”
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Agency Official Charged with Evaluating Conflicts
Official

Responsibilities
identifies “administrative services” that are exempt from COI
regulationso
receives contractors’ written notification of OCIsp & disclosure / use
TARP Chief of nonpublic informationq
Compliance evaluates whether proposed measures adequately mitigate PCIsr
Officer
can waive PCIss
can waive any regulatory requirement “that is not otherwise
imposed by law when it is clear from the totality of the circumstances that a waiver is in the government’s interest”t

a. A “key individual” is “an individual providing services to a private sector entity who participates personally and substantially, through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, or the rendering of advice, in the negotiation or performance of, or monitoring for compliance under” the contract. 31
C.F.R. § 31.201 (2010) (emphasis added).
b. Id. § 31.212(a). A “management official” is “an individual within a retained entity’s organization who has substantial responsibility for the direction and control of the retained entity’s policies and operations,” including
members of a management committee or executive committee or (in entities
without such a committee) general partners. See id. § 31.201.
c. Id. § 31.201. The TARP regulation does not impose restrictions directly on contractor personnel. Instead, it mandates that contractors ensure that
their employees have no personal conflicts of interest. Id.
d. Id. § 31.213(a)(1).
e. Id. § 31.214(a).
f. Id. § 31.214(b).
g. Id. § 31.217(c)(5). The TARP regulation does not impose confidentiality requirements directly on contractor personnel. Instead, it imposes these
confidentiality restrictions on the contracting entity and requires that the entity obtain from these individuals nondisclosure agreements. Id.
h. Id. § 31.217(b). The TARP regulation defines “nonpublic information”
as “[a]ny information that Treasury provides to a [contractor] . . . or that the
[contractor] obtains or develops pursuant to the arrangement . . . until the
Treasury determines otherwise in writing, or the information becomes part of
the body of public information from a source other than the retained entity.”
Id. § 31.217(a).
i. Id. § 31.213(a)(2).
j. Id. § 31.212(b).
k. Id. § 31.217(c)(5).
l. Id. § 31.212(b).
m. Id. § 31.212(d).
n. Id. § 31.217(c)(3).
o. Id. § 31.200(b).
p. Id. § 31.211(f ).
q. Id. § 31.217(c).
r. Id. § 31.212(c).
s. Id. § 31.212(c).
t. Id. § 31.215.

